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Abstract
Monotheistic religions such as Judaism and Christianity affirm that God
loves all humans and created them in His image. However, we have learned
from Darwin that we were not created separately from other life on earth.
Some Christians opposed Darwinian evolution because it undercut certain
design arguments for the existence of God. Today there is the growing idea
that the fine-tuned constants of physics might be explained by a multiverse
with very many different sets of constants of physics. Some Christians op-
pose the multiverse for similarly undercutting other design arguments for the
existence of God. However, undercutting one argument does not disprove its
conclusion. Here I argue that multiverse ideas, though not automatically a
solution to the problems of physics, deserve serious consideration and are not
in conflict with Christian theology as I see it.
Although this paper as a whole is addressed primarily to Christians in
cosmology and others interested in the relation between the multiverse and
theism, it should be of interest to a wider audience. Proper subsets of this
paper are addressed to other Christians, to other theists, to other cosmologists,
to other scientists, and to others interested in the multiverse and theism.
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Preface Added to the Original
This paper was originally written as an expansion, for the proceedings, of lectures
given at Shandong University in Jinan, China, to students and other academics who
were interested in the relation between science and religion. Therefore, it employs
a variety of philosophical and theological argumentations that go beyond the usual
scientific reasoning of physics papers. However, I believe that this paper may also
be of sufficient interest for many physicists to be included in the usual physics eprint
archives, despite the differences in style. (Those who are not interested in Christian
theology may wish to skip the Bible verses and stories, though they illustrate the
claim of the breadth of God’s love. Similarly, those not interested in arithmetic may
wish to skip the example of the large finite set of pili-increasers and the offer of a
prize of perhaps $1051 for the first member to be found of this set of 10154 or so
members, though this set illustrates how evidence for a multiverse may be contained
within a single universe.)
The written version of this paper has many different purposes. One primary
purpose is to persuade my fellow Christians that multiverse ideas are not necessarily
opposed to theism and to Christianity. A secondary purpose, and one of the main
reasons for posting it on the physics eprint archives, is to show other scientists that
not all Christians are opposed to multiverse ideas, just as not all Christians are
opposed to evolutionary ideas, even though some Christians have opposed both.
I have long been open to multiverse ideas and remember asking Steven Weinberg
around 1983 what he thought of the idea that the constants of physics might vary
from one component of the quantum state of the universe to another. At that time,
Weinberg said, “I would find that very depressing.” However, Weinberg has come
around to champion the idea that the cosmological ‘constant’ might vary across a
multiverse1.
Even more recently, Weinberg has made the following argument2:
“Finally, I have heard the objection that, in trying to explain why the
1Steven Weinberg, “Anthropic Bound on the Cosmological Constant,” Physical Review Let-
ters 59, 2607-2610 (1987); Hugo Martel, Paul R. Shapiro, and Steven Weinberg, “Likely Val-
ues of the Cosmological Constant,” The Astrophysical Journal 492, 29-40, astro-ph/9701099,
<http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/9701099>.
2Steven Weinberg, “Living in the Multiverse,” in Bernard Carr, ed., Universe or Mul-
tiverse? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), pp. 29-42, hep-th/0511037,
<http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0511037>.
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laws of nature are so well suited for the appearance and evolution of life,
anthropic arguments take on some of the flavor of religion. I think that
just the opposite is the case. Just as Darwin and Wallace explained how
the wonderful adaptations of living forms could arise without supernat-
ural intervention, so the string landscape may explain how the constants
of nature that we observe can take values suitable for life without being
fine-tuned by a benevolent creator. I found this parallel well understood
in a surprising place, a New York Times op-ed article by Christoph
Scho¨nborn, Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna.3 His article concludes as
follows:
‘Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, faced with sci-
entific claims like neo-Darwinism and the multiverse hypothe-
sis in cosmology invented to avoid the overwhelming evidence
for purpose and design found in modern science, the Catholic
Church will again defend human nature by proclaiming that
the immanent design evident in nature is real. Scientific the-
ories that try to explain away the appearance of design as the
result of ‘chance and necessity’ are not scientific at all, but, as
John Paul put it, an abdication of human intelligence.’
“It’s nice to see work in cosmology get some of the attention given
these days to evolution, but of course it is not religious preconceptions
like these that can decide any issues in science.”
Here I wish to go on record as a Christian who respectfully differs from Cardinal
Scho¨nborn’s opinion that the multiverse idea was “invented to avoid the overwhelm-
ing evidence for purpose and design found in modern science” and that it is “an
abdication of human intelligence.” Different multiverse theories were invented for
different reasons, and there are intelligent reasons for investigating them. Further-
more, while I agree with Weinberg that multiverse theories would not require that
the ‘constants’ of nature be fine tuned, I would also insist that they do not preclude
the possibility that the entire multiverse was designed at a higher level, say by a
benevolent Creator.
3C. Scho¨nborn, N. Y. Times, 7 July 2005, p. A23.
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1 God’s Love for All Humans
A central point of Judaism and Christianity is that God loves everyone. For
Christians, one of the most famous verses in the Bible is in the Gospel of John,
John 3:16: “For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that
whoever believes in Him should not perish but have everlasting life” [1]. However,
this idea starts way back in the Old Testament (the first part of the Bible, the part
accepted by both Jews and Christians).
In Genesis, the first book of the Old Testament, God began a revelation through
the family of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (who became the Israelites, Hebrews,
and/or Jews). In God’s original call to Abraham in Genesis 12:1-3, He said, “I will
make you a great nation; I will bless you and make your name great; . . . and in you all
the families of the earth shall be blessed.” As a personal example of this, my family is
not Jewish, and yet academically I have been marvelously blessed by the remarkable
contributions of a vast number of brilliant Jewish scientists, and spiritually I have
been immeasurably blessed by the teachings, life, death, and resurrection of the
Jewish rabbi Yeshua, known in English as Jesus, who we Christians believe to be
the Christ or Messiah, the anointed Son of God and Savior.
Later in the Old Testament, in the book of Ruth, God’s love was extended
beyond the Israelites to Ruth, a woman of the foreign country of Moab who married
an Israelite who had settled there during a famine in Israel. After both Ruth and her
mother-in-law Naomi were widowed, Ruth moved with Naomi to Israel and became
an ancestor to Israel’s greatest king, David, as well as an ancestor of Jesus.
Jonah is another book in the Old Testament stressing the extension of God’s
love beyond the Israelites. This famous short story tells of the prophet Jonah who
was sent by God to preach against the evils of Nineveh, a great city of ancient
Assyria, on the eastern bank of the Tigris River at the location of the present city
of Mosul, Iraq. As an Israelite enemy of Nineveh, Jonah wanted Nineveh to remain
unrepentant and be destroyed by God. Therefore, initially he refused to go warn
that evil city but rather fled in the opposite direction. As Jonah later admitted to
God, “Therefore I fled previously to Tarshish; for I know that You are a gracious
and merciful God, slow to anger and abundant in lovingkindness, One who relents
from doing harm.” However, through a remarkable event God got Jonah to obey
Him, and the Ninevites repented and were spared, still to the bitter anger of Jonah.
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The book closes with God’s emphasizing His love for the foreign city: “And should
I not pity Nineveh, that great city, in which are more than one hundred and twenty
thousand persons who cannot discern between their right hand and their left—and
much livestock?”
In the New Testament, God sent His Son Jesus Christ to live, die on the cross for
our sins, and defeat death by His resurrection, to bring forgiveness and salvation to
all of us who cannot meet God’s standards as set down by the laws God had given
to the Israelites in the Old Testament. As the Apostle Paul expressed it in Romans
3:23-24: “For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, being justified freely
by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.” This Gospel message
of salvation by faith was offered to all people, not just the Jews. The last recorded
words of Jesus Christ, in the Gospel of Matthew 28:18-20, are these: “All authority
has been given to Me in heaven and on earth. Go therefore and make disciples of
all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the
Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things that I have commanded you; and
lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the age.”
The first book of the history of Christianity, after the Gospel stories of the life,
death, and resurrection of Jesus, is the Acts of the Apostles. It particularly records
how the Apostles Peter and Paul began the work of extending the Gospel message
beyond the Israelites to all nations.
God not only loves all people, but He also said that He created all people in
His own image. As it is written in the first book of the Bible, in Genesis 1:27, “So
God created man in His own image; in the image of God He created him; male and
female He created them.”
The question arises as to how unique does that make us. The Bible certainly
emphasizes that the image of God extends to all humans. But are we created entirely
separately from the rest of creation?
Some have taken the image of God for humans to imply that God created us
individually and separately from other living beings. However, Darwin’s theory
of evolution suggests that we are related to the rest of life. It also suggests that
we humans were not separately created by an individual act, independent of the
creation of the remainder of the earth’s biosphere.
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2 Parallels Between Evolution and Multiverse Ideas
When Darwin proposed evolution, many conservative Christians accepted it. One
famous example was Benjamin B. Warfield (1851-1921), the conservative Christian
theologian and principal of Princeton Seminary from 1887 to 1921. Warfield wrote
the chapter on “The Deity of Christ” in The Fundamentals, from which the term
Fundamentalism arose. Thus one of the most famous original Fundamentalists ac-
cepted Darwinian evolution, writing [2], “I am free to say, for myself, that I do not
think that there is any general statement in the Bible or any part of the account of
creation, either as given in Genesis 1 and 2 or elsewhere alluded to, that need be
opposed to evolution.”
However, many Christians later came to oppose evolution, perhaps most fa-
mously some other Fundamentalists. Although there were many reasons for this,
which I cannot get into here, one possible reason is that evolution did remove one
particular design argument for the existence of God, that all of the marvelously
many different species of living things on earth had been separately designed and
created by God. Nevertheless, evolution did not disprove the existence of God or
of some overall design. Indeed, there are many leading theologians and scientists
today that accept both evolution and creation by God, such as Francis Collins, the
head of the Human Genome Project [3].
It seems to me that there may be a parallel development occurring today. Before
Darwin, some Christians took the marvels of humanity as evidence of separate and
individual design. Now, some Christians take the marvels of the fine-tuning of the
constants of physics as evidence of theism and often of separate and individual design
of these constants by God [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 3]. Here I wish to argue that
this could be equally mistaken.
I have found that my views are rather similar to those of a minority of theists,
notably John Leslie [13, 14], Stephen Barr [15], Robin Collins [16, 17, 18], Gerald
Cleaver [19, 20], Klaas Kraay [21], and others that Kraay cites, who break tradition
and argue that a multiverse could reveal an even more grand design of the universe,
since the physical process that generates the multiverse would have to have suitable
basic laws and initial conditions to produce any life at all (no matter what the
constants of physics are, since often they seem to be fine tuned for several different
reasons [13, 14]). The laws and initial conditions would apparently have to be even
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more special to produce not just life, but life like ours observing the order we actually
do see around us. Leslie, Barr, Collins, Cleaver, Kraay, and others claim that since
God is infinitely creative, it makes sense to say that He might create a physical
reality much larger than the single visible part of the universe or multiverse that we
can observe directly.
3 Fine Tuning in Our Universe
Now it does seem to be true that we could not be here if many of the constants of
physics were significantly different, so that in our part of the universe, the constants
of physics do in fact seem to be fine tuned for our kind of life. This is generally
agreed upon both by those who attempt to use this fine tuning to support theism, as
in the references above, and by many scientists who are usually neutral or opposed
to such an attempt [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. Of course
no one knows what other forms of life might be possible if the constants of physics
were significantly different, but the general consensus seems to be that if would be
very difficult to imagine the possibility of any complex life at all existing if certain
combinations of the constants of physics were greatly different.
For example, one of the most remarkable fine tunings is the value of the cosmo-
logical constant or energy density of the ‘dark energy’ responsible for the current
acceleration of distant galaxies away from each other. (Even though a positive cos-
mological constant corresponds to positive energy density which normally would
gravitate or tend to pull things together, it is also accompanied by tension or neg-
ative pressure that antigravitates by an amount that is larger by a factor of three,
the number of dimensions of space. Thus the net observed effect of the positive
cosmological constant or dark energy is antigravity, the gravitational repulsion of
otherwise empty space that causes distant galaxies now to be accelerating apart.)
Measurements show that the cosmological constant is more than 120 orders of
magnitude smaller than unity in certain natural units (called Planck units, obtained
by setting to unity the speed of light, Planck’s quantum constant of action, and
Newton’s gravitational constant). With the other constants kept fixed, it would be
difficult to have a universe with gravitationally formed structures lasting long enough
for life if the cosmological constant were even just a few orders of magnitude (powers
of 10) larger than its observed value. But even if one tuned the other constants to
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allow the possibility of such structures when the cosmological constant has a value
many orders of magnitude larger than its observed value, one still seems to need it to
be many orders smaller than unity. So one does not see how to avoid at least some
significant amount of fine tuning of this parameter. (Basically, if the cosmological
constant were of the order of unity in the natural Planck units, the spacetime of
the universe would always have large quantum mechanical fluctuations, and no one
knows any plausible way to have persisting complex structures that one could call
life in such a case.)
Another constant that is many orders of magnitude away from unity, in this
case about 36 orders of magnitude larger than unity, is the ratio of the electrostatic
repulsion to the gravitational attraction between two protons (the nuclei at the
centers of hydrogen atoms). With other constants kept fixed, it seems that one
could not have the types of stars that appear to be necessary for life if this constant
differed by much more than even one order of magnitude (factor of 10) from its actual
value. Again one could try to imagine a universe hospitable to some other form of
life when this constant is significantly different by also tuning other constants to an
appropriate range, but again it seems that complex life of any form relying mainly
on the electromagnetic and gravitational forces would be impossible if this constant
were close to unity. (Then it seems that one could not have stars, planets, and
living organisms with large numbers of atoms, since the number of atoms in such
structures generally scales as a positive power of this constant and would approach
some small number near unity if this constant were itself near unity [34, 35].)
Martin Rees [28] discusses in much more detail these two constants and four
others in our universe that are crucial for its properties. Life as we know it would
apparently be impossible if any one of them were greatly different (with the others
held fixed). So although it might not be necessary for all of them to have their
observed values, there are some combinations of them that apparently could not be
very much different and yet give a universe with life, at least life at all similar to
present life on earth.
4 Explanations for Fine Tuning
So there is a general consensus that there is at least some fine tuning of the
constants of physics in our part of the universe, though not that all of the constants
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had to have values close to what we observe. But what is the explanation for this
phenomenon? There are three general types of explanations that are often put
forward.
Some suggest that the fine tuning was done by a separate act of God to allow life.
Others say that it is presumably an accidental fluke. And yet others propose that it
arises from a huge multiverse of very many different possible constants of physics.
It is also noted in several of the references that I have given, such as [13, 36], that
the three explanations are not mutually exclusive, so that virtually any combination
of them is logically possible. However, it is the multiverse explanation that is now
rapidly growing in favor, though not without a lot of opposition from both theists
and nontheists.
One must quickly point out that each of these three explanations really stands for
a class of explanations, so that one should actually compare specific proposals taken
from these classes rather than the classes themselves. Theists of different theological
convictions might propose different ideas of how God would choose the constants.
Those saying that the fine tuning is a fluke might say that the constants are deter-
mined by any number of different mathematical structures that just happened to
give biophilic values, or they might propose that there is truly some random process
determining the constants in some way not derivable from any simple mathematical
structure. And of course there are a huge number of possible multiverse theories.
Some multiverse theories seem to me to be too general to be plausible, such
as the idea of David Lewis [37] that all logical possibilities actually exist, or the
original idea of Max Tegmark [38] that all mathematical structures have physical
reality. These would seem to leave it unexplained why what we see has the order
that it does, whereas a random possibility from all logical possibilities or from all
mathematical structures would surely be far more chaotic [13, 14, 15, 36] (though I
now admit that my objection to Tegmark’s original Level IV multiverse as logically
inconsistent was wrong, since I misinterpreted each mathematical structure to be
a description of reality rather than being simply a part of reality). However, there
might be other multiverse theories that are more explanatory of the order that we
do observe, perhaps arising naturally out of elegant but specific laws of nature. For
example, Tegmark’s more recent ideas [39] that physical reality might be restricted
to the mathematical structures of computable functions seems to me more hopeful,
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though I would disagree with his view that physical reality is just mathematical
structure or syntax and instead believe that it includes at least the semantics of
consciousness.
One natural way to get a multiverse is to have a universe so large that highly
varied conditions occur somewhere. Another is from Everett many-worlds [40], that
all the quantum possibilities are actually realized. However, those possibilities do
not necessarily give varying constants of physics.
One scenario that seems more hopeful is to get multiverses from inflation [41, 42,
43], which is a very rapid exponential expansion of the early universe that may make
the universe enormously larger than what we can observe of it. If the inflationary
scenario can include phase transitions, and if the constants of physics can differ
across phase transitions, inflation tends to produce all such possibilities.
Recently it has been realized that string/M theory apparently leads to a huge
multiverse of 10500 or so different vacua or sets of constants [44]. This would appar-
ently be enough for the constants we see to occur somewhere (maybe once per 10200
vacua or so). Then perhaps 10300 or so vacua would fit what we see.
If only one universe in 10M could fit our observations, but if 10N different uni-
verses exist in the multiverse, then it might not be surprising that what we observe
exists if N > M . E.g., in the previous paragraph, I was saying that perhaps N
is around 500 and M is around 200, so then indeed N > M . However, the actual
numbers are known very poorly [44]. We really don’t yet know whether N > M in
string/M theory, but that seems plausible. Then what we see could be explained
without its having to be individually selected.
One might still ask whether the multiverse explanation always works, assuming
that it has enough universes (e.g., N > M). Is it sufficient to explain what we
see by a multiverse theory in which there are enough different conditions that ours
necessarily occurs somewhere?
I would say no, but rather that there is the further requirement that the condi-
tions we observe should not be too rare out of all the conditions that are observed
over the entire multiverse. A theory making our observations too rare should not
be considered a good theory.
Good theories should be both intrinsically plausible and fit observations. Intrin-
sic plausibility is quantified by what is called the a priori probability of the theory,
10
the probability that one might assign to it from purely theoretical background knowl-
edge, without considering any observations. The fit to observations is quantified by
the conditional probability of the observation given the theory, what is called the
likelihood. Then the probability of the theory after taking into consideration the
observation, what is called the a posteriori probability of the theory, is given by
Bayes’ theorem as being proportional to the product of the a priori probability and
the likelihood [45].
I take the a priori probabilities of theories (intrinsic plausibilities before consid-
ering the observations) to be subjective but to be generally assigned higher values
for simpler theories, by the principle that is called Occam’s razor. One problem with
this is that David Deutsch [46, 47] notes that simplicity depends on one’s background
knowledge that itself depends on the laws of physics.
The likelihood of a theory is itself neither the a priori or the a posteriori prob-
ability of the theory, but rather the conditional probability, not of the theory, but
of the observation given the theory. A theory that uniquely gives one’s observation
would have unit likelihood but might have very low a priori probability.
For example, consider an extreme solipsistic theory that only one’s actual mo-
mentary observation exists, not anyone’s else’s or even any of one’s own in either
the past or the future, and perhaps not even that an external world exists at all.
This theory would predict that observation with certainty if it were correct. (If the
theory were true, certainly the observation would be that single one predicted by the
theory.) Therefore, for that observation the likelihood is unity. However, such an
extreme solipsistic theory, giving all the details of one’s observation or conscious per-
ception without an external world giving other observations, would surely be highly
complex and so would be viewed as extremely implausible, much more implausible
than an alternate theory in which the observation resulted from the existence of an
external world that also gives other observations. Therefore, this extreme solipsistic
theory would be assigned very low a priori probability.
At the other extreme, consider the simple theory that predicts all possible ob-
servations equally (arguably a consequence of something like the modal realism of
David Lewis [37]). Since this theory is so simple, it might be assigned a high a priori
probability, but then because of the enormous number of observations it predicts
with equal probability, it would give very low likelihood.
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5 Applying Bayes’ Theorem
Let us consider a simple example with three possible theories and use Bayes’
theorem to calculate the resulting a posteriori probabilities. Suppose that we have
theory T1 with a priori probability 0.000 000 1 that would give probability 1 for
what we see (unit likelihood; the observation would be certain if this theory were
true), theory T2 with a priori probability 0.001 that would give probability 0.01 for
what we see (1% likelihood), and theory T3 with a priori probability 0.998 999 9 that
would give probability 0.000 000 1 for what we see (0.000 01% likelihood). Assume
for simplicity that these three theories exhaust all possible theories.
Then the product of the a priori probability and of the likelihood for the first
theory, T1, is 0.000 000 1, for T2 is 0.000 01, and for T3 is nearly 0.000 000 1. The a
posteriori probabilities of these three theories, by Bayes’ theorem, is proportional to
these products, so all we need to do is to normalize the products by dividing each of
them by their sum, which is nearly 0.000 010 2. After dividing by this, we then get
that to two-digit accuracy, the approximate a posteriori probability of T1 is 0.01, of
T2 is 0.98, and of T3 is 0.01. That is, after the observation, we would think that
theories T1 and T3 each have only about 1% probability of being correct, whereas in
the end theory T2 is seen to be 98% probable.
In this case, neither T1 with its unit likelihood, nor T3 with its nearly unit a
priori probability, gains the highest a posteriori probability, which instead goes to
the compromise theory T2, which had both its a priori probability (0.001) and its
likelihood (0.01) rather low. Of course, there is no guarantee that a compromise
theory will gain the greatest a posteriori probability, since the result depends on
the particular a priori probabilities and likelihoods of the theories being tested.
However, if the theories were ranked in order from most specifically predictive, say
giving unit likelihood or unit probability for the specific observation, to the simplest
theory with the highest a priori probability, it would seem unusual for either of
the two extreme theories to end up with the greatest a posteriori probability. In
this way I would be surprised if the theory for the universe or multiverse with
the greatest a posteriori probability turned out to be either the most specifically
predictive theory (giving precisely one’s own observation with certainty, and no
probability of any other possible observation one might have had instead) or the
simplest (say predicting all possible observations with equal likelihood).
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Suppose that as a theist one wants to assign a priori probabilities to different
theories of what kind of universe or multiverse God might want to create. One
might guess that God might want to create the simplest or most elegant universe or
multiverse that has beings like us that He considers to be in His image or that can
have fellowship with Him or that has some other moral good in it. Then the theist
might try to guess whether it would be simpler for God to create just one universe
with a single set of constants of physics, or whether it would be simpler for Him to
create a multiverse with a variety of sets of constants.
If there were a simple principle for choosing the particular constants that we ob-
serve (e.g., simple laws of physics that give these uniquely), then one might suppose
that God would prefer just using those laws and creating a unique set of constants.
However, we don’t see any reason why the constants we observe should be uniquely
preferred over other possibilities. Of course, this could easily just be a failure of
our imagination and knowledge, so we might continue looking. Even nontheistic
scientists like David Gross might prefer a single-universe theory with a single set
of constants of physics and persist in looking for simple laws of physics that would
give this unique result, following Winston Churchill in saying, “Never, never, never,
never, never give up” [48].
On the other hand, not finding a simple principle from which one can deduce
uniquely the constants of physics we observe, and having some potential theories
like string/M theory that strongly suggest a multiverse instead, might lead many,
both theists and nontheists, to look for a multiverse theory instead. From a theistic
perspective, it might seem simpler (or better in other regards) for God to choose a
variety of the sets of constants of physics, a multiverse rather than a single universe.
The situation is reminiscent of that facing Johannes Kepler, who attempted to
explain both the number of planets and their orbits. He was remarkably successful
in describing the shape of the orbits, but his attempted explanation that the number
was six failed, as was directly shown by the discovery of more planets. Now we know
that different solar systems can have different numbers of planets, so there would
not have been a way for Kepler successfully to explain a unique value. We are faced
with a similar situation with the constants of physics, in that at present we do not
know whether they are like the orbital shapes, which can be explained by simple
principles (e.g., Newton’s law of universal gravitation) or whether they are like the
13
number of planets, which can have different values for different systems. I do not see
that it ultimately makes a significant difference theologically which way the answer
turns out, but as seekers of the truth we would like to find what is actually the case,
or in theistic terms, what God actually did. Given our present knowledge, to me it
currently seems simpler to hypothesize that God created a multiverse, and I would
argue that that is a theologically acceptable option for Christians and other theists
to consider.
6 Toy Multiverse Model from Arithmetic
For those of you who are mathematically inclined, the following example from
arithmetic might be a helpful analogue, illustrating how observations within just
one universe can give evidence of whether or not other universes also exist.
Suppose that we imagine possible universes to be analogous to positive integers,
and one’s observed universe to be analogous to a particular integer. For example,
suppose that there were a simple prescription for translating the constants of physics
into a single integer (e.g., some binary string encoding the values of the constants).
Then we might seek the simplest explanation for the integer corresponding to the
observed universe or to the observed constants of physics in that universe.
If the integer itself were simple, such as 22
2
2
2
, which is very large (19 729 decimal
digits) but quite simple to state, one might suppose that the simplest explanation
would be an explanation that postulates just the existence of one universe and hence
just that one simple integer. On the other hand, if the integer were a very complex
member of a simple set of integers, then it might be simpler to postulate that the
entire set exists.
For example, any large positive integer, no matter how complex, is a member of
the set of all positive integers, which is a very simple set. If the observed universe
corresponded to such a very complex integer (not given by a simple algorithm such as
the example 22
2
2
2
above), one might suppose that it would be simpler to suppose that
the much simpler set of all possible positive integers existed. (Note that although this
set is infinite, it does not encompass negative integers, rational numbers, algebraic
numbers, real numbers, complex numbers, quaternions, or any number of other
mathematical structures, so that even an infinite multiverse need not encompass all
logical possibilities.)
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However, one might worry that if the set of possibilities is infinite (even the
highly limited infinity of the positive integers), then the probability of getting the
particular observed integer would be zero, so the hypothesis or theory that the
multiverse corresponded to the simple set of all possible positive integers would
be assigned zero likelihood. (One way to avoid this would be to put a simple
normalizable weight upon all the positive integers, so that the total weight is finite,
allowing one to get nonzero probabilities for all finite positive integers, but for now
let us try something else.)
To allow equal weights for all positive integers corresponding to universes in a
multiverse, one might hypothesize that the multiverse corresponds to some finite
set of positive integers. As an example of a large but finite simple set, consider the
following set of what I call pili-increasers: positive integers n for which pi(n)/li(n)
is both greater than one and greater than that of any smaller n. Here pi(n) is the
number of primes not greater than n, and li(n) is the Cauchy principal value of
the integral of the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of x from 0 to n, which by
the prime number theorem gives a good asymptotic estimate for pi(n) but which
oscillates around pi(n) an infinite number of times as n increases [49].
This set of pili-increasers is a fairly simple set to define, and yet it apparently has
more members than particles in the observable universe (the part of our universe
we can see from light emitted after most of the electrons and ions combined in the
early universe to make it transparent, which contains roughly 1090 particles). Each
member of this set of pili-increasers likely has more than a thousand binary digits,
so almost all individual members of this set are almost certainly much more complex
than the entire set. (Imagine trying to memorize one of these thousand-binary-digit
numbers, in comparison with trying to memorize my short definition of the set.)
The smallest member of this set of pili-increasers has been estimated to be about
1.398 × 10316 [50]. Smaller candidate pili-increasers, for example near 10190, have
not yet been rigorously ruled out, although such smaller numbers appear unlikely
actually to be pili-increasers. (Ref. [50] only gives rigorous upper bounds on the
smallest pili-increaser, the smallest x ≥ 2 for which pi(x) >li(x).)
Less is known about the largest pili-increaser, which I call the pili-maximizer,
the positive integer n that maximizes the ratio of pi(n) to li(n). However, from
Figure 2b of [50], it appears that it might be about 10311 larger than the most likely
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candidate for the smallest pili-increaser (i.e., larger by roughly one part in 140 000 of
the smallest pili-increaser that is likely to be near 1.4×10316), and give a maximum
value of pi(n)/li(n) approximately 1 + 10−154. The number of pili-increasers would
be expected to be about twice the value of pi(n)−li(n) at the pili-maximizer, which
from Figure 2b of [50] appears to be nearly 10154. Thus one might expect somewhat
more than 10154 pili-maximizers, but spread over a range of roughly 10311 from the
smallest to the largest, so that if one picked a number at random within that range,
the probability might be of the order of 10−157, or one part in more than thirteen
trillions multiplied together, of picking a pili-increaser.
In fact, no one knows the precise value of any of the individual members of this
set of pili-increasers. I am hereby offering to pay $1 U.S. for each of the binary digits
(probably 1051, if the estimates above are indeed applicable for all the members and
are not just upper bounds for the smallest member) of the first member of this set
that is found explicitly as a binary integer and is proved to be a member of the set.
I am also offering a more attainable prize of $1 U.S. for each binary digit proved to
be correct for the logarithm to base 2 of the pili-maximizer (up to as many binary
digits of this logarithm as are needed to give the integer precisely, perhaps 1061; I
won’t pay any more for the arbitrarily large number of additional digits that can be
found trivially if and when the exact pili-maximizer integer is found).
Although there is thus apparently an enormous number of members of this simple
finite set, they are also apparently extremely rare among all integers in the same
range. If one chose a random integer between the smallest and the largest member of
this set, the chance that it would be in the set would apparently be smaller than the
chance of choosing one particular particle out of all those in the observable universe.
Therefore, if in some hypothetical universe some observer found the constants of the
physics translated into one member of that extremely sparse set, it would certainly
be strong evidence of fine tuning, strong evidence against a multiverse corresponding
to all possible positive integers and even against a finite multiverse corresponding
to all positive integers within one part in 140 000 of the smallest pili-increaser.
If one then further found that this integer were a special member of the set
of pili-increasers, say the smallest or the largest, that would be such extreme fine
tuning that it would be strong evidence for the hypothesis of a single value or a
single universe (or at least for just a small number of integer values or universes).
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On the other hand, if the evidence were strong that this number were not a
special member of the set (though there is no algorithm for proving this), then that
particular integer would apparently be much more complex than the simple set of
all pili-increasers. In this case, I would say that the observer would be justified to
postulate the existence of a multiverse giving the entire simple set, and not just the
particular complex though fine-tuned example directly observed.
Although one might accuse this observer of being extravagant in postulating this
enormous set of perhaps roughly 10154 multiverses, in reality the entire set would be
much simpler than the individual member observed (at least if the individual member
were in fact a random member of the set, as almost all members are, though there is
no algorithm for proving that any particular member is). This is one sense in which
an observation in one single universe can be more simply explained by postulating
a large set of universes in a multiverse, though without needing to postulate that
all possible universes exist.
This simple toy example from arithmetic illustrates the fact that in principle
even from one single observation result (the one integer) in a single universe, one
can gain strong evidence (though even here not a rigorous proof) for the much greater
simplicity of either a single-universe or a multiverse hypothesis, depending on what
is observed. Of course, in practice, even in this toy example it would be very difficult
to calculate whether the integer were in the simple set of pili-increasers and then
whether it were a special member such as the smallest or the largest. However, one
might develop a suspicion that it might be a member if one found that the integer
were a prime (as all pili-increasers are) in the relatively narrow range between the
smallest member and the largest member, for which one can imagine fairly good
approximate estimates being made in the foreseeable future. Then if one found that
it were within a narrow uncertainty of the estimate for one of the endpoints of the
range, one might suspect that it is at the endpoint and interpret that as evidence
for the single-universe hypothesis, whereas if one found that it were not near an
endpoint, one might take that as evidence for the multiverse hypothesis that the
entire simple set existed.
Thus one can gain theoretical evidence for (or against) a multiverse even from
observations restricted to one single universe, and in principle one might even gain
evidence of how large the multiverse is. One’s limited observations within a single
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universe are just a small sample of the whole, but if it is a sufficiently rich sample,
it can give much information about the rest that is not directly observed.
7 The Growth of Our Knowledge of the Universe
Our whole growth of knowledge of the universe has been an expansion of its
scope. As one grows as an infant, one rapidly grows beyond the view that one’s
present observation is all that is real, as one develops memories about the past and
anticipations of the future. One then goes beyond solipsism and gains an under-
standing that other persons or observers exist as well. In the early stage of human
development, there was the focus on one’s family, which was then gradually extended
to one’s tribe, one’s nation, one’s race, and, one might hope, to all humans. But
then when one further considers what other conscious observations may be going
on, one might well believe that consciousness extends to other creatures, such as
other animals.
Of course, one’s direct observation never extends beyond one’s own immediate
conscious perception, so one can never prove that there are past or future perceptions
as well (and I know philosophers who do not believe the future exists). Similarly,
one can never directly experience even the present conscious perceptions of another,
which engenders the problem of other minds in philosophy. Nevertheless, most of us
believe that we have fairly good indirect evidence for the existence of other conscious
experiences, at least for other humans on earth with whom we can communicate,
though it is logically possible that neither they nor any external world actually
exists. (For me, I believe that it is much simpler to explain the details of my present
observation or conscious perception or experience by assuming that an external
world and other conscious experiences also exist, than by assuming that just my
own momentary conscious perception exists.)
We may now extend the reasoning to suppose that if the universe is large enough,
it will also include conscious extraterrestrials, even though we do not have even
indirect evidence for them that is so nearly direct as our (inevitably still indirect)
evidence for other conscious beings on earth. We can further theorize that if the
universe is so large that there never will be any contact between its distant parts
and our part, there still might be other conscious beings not in causal contact with
us, so that we never could communicate with them to get, even in principle, the
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indirect evidence of the same qualitative nature that we have for other humans here
on earth with us.
A next step might be to postulate conscious beings and experiences in other
universes totally disconnected from ours, so that even if one could imagine travel-
ing faster than the speed of light, there would simply be no way to get there from
here; the two parts would be in totally disconnected spacetimes. A similar situa-
tion would occur for putative conscious experiences in other branches of an Everett
‘many-worlds’ wavefunction or quantum state. From accepting the existence of such
disconnected observers, it hardly seems like an excessive additional step to imagine
observers in universes or parts of the multiverse with different constants of physics.
One might even imagine observers in entirely different universes, not related to ours
in the way an entire multiverse might be related by having one single over-arching
set of natural laws.
So in this sense, the idea of a multiverse seems to be rather a natural extension of
our usual ideas of accepting a reality beyond one’s immediate conscious perception,
which is all the experience for which one has direct access. All the rest of one’s
knowledge is purely theoretical, though one’s brain (assuming that one’s brain exists
and not just the logical minimum of one’s immediate conscious awareness as a single
disembodied entity with absolutely nothing else) is apparently constructed to bring
this knowledge into one’s awareness without one’s having to be consciously aware of
the details of why one seems to be aware of the existence of other conscious beings.
Despite the naturalness of the progression of ideas that leads to multiverse the-
ories, there are various objections to it. However, none of the objections seems to
me to be convincing, as there are highly plausible rebuttals to the objections.
8 Objections to Multiverse Ideas
A scientific objection to a multiverse theory might be that the multiverse (be-
yond our observed part, which is within one single universe) is not observable or
testable. But if one had precise theories for single universes and for multiverses that
gave the distributions of different conditions, one could make statistical tests of our
observations (likely or unlikely in each distribution). Unfortunately, no such realistic
theory exists yet for either a single universe or a multiverse, so I would agree that
at present we simply do not have any good theories for either to test.
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Another objection is that a multiverse is not a clear consequence of any existing
theory. Although it is beginning to appear to be a consequence of string/M theory,
that is not yet certain, which is why there can be theorists like David Gross who are
still holding out hope that string/M theory might turn out to be a single-universe
theory after all, possibly enabling theorists (if they could perform the relevant cal-
culations) to fulfill their wildest dreams of being able to calculate the constants of
physics uniquely from some simple principles. One first needs to make string/M
theory into a precise theory and calculate its consequences, whether single universe
or multiverse. And if that theory gives predictions that do not give a good statistical
fit to observations, one needs to find a better theory that does.
A philosophical objection to a multiverse theory is that it is extravagant to
assume unfathomable numbers of unobservable universes. This is a variant upon
the psychological gut reaction that surely a multiverse would be more complex than
a single universe, and hence should be assigned a lower a priori probability. But
this is not necessarily so, as I have explained above. The whole can be simpler than
its parts, as the set of all integers is quite simple, certainly simpler than nearly all
the (arbitrarily large) individual integers that form its parts. The mathematical
example above of the simple set of pili-increasers also shows how even a very large
finite set can be much simpler than almost all of its individual members.
As a further rebuttal of the accusation of extravagance, a theist can say that
since God can do anything that is logically possible and that fits with His nature
and purposes, then there is apparently no difficulty for Him to create as many
universes as He pleases. He might prefer elegance in the principles by which He
creates a vast multiverse over paucity of universes, i.e., economy of principles rather
than economy of materials.
Another philosophical objection to multiverses is that they can be used to explain
anything, and thereby explain nothing. I would strongly agree for this criticism of
multiverse theories that are too vague or diffuse, which do not sufficiently restrict the
measure on the set of observations to favor ordered ones such as what we observe.
There is a genuine need for a multiverse theory not to spread out the probability
measure for observations so thinly that it makes our observation too improbable.
So this objection would be a valid objection to vast classes of possible multiverse
theories, but I do not see that it is an objection in principle against a good multiverse
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theory. Certainly not just any multiverse theory is acceptable, and even if simple
single-universe theories do not work for explaining our observations, it will no doubt
be quite a challenge to find a good multiverse theory that does succeed.
Most of the objections I have raised and attempted to answer so far would
apply both to theistic and nontheistic scientists. However, if one is a theist, one
might imagine that there are additional objections to multiverse theories, just as
some theists had additional objections to Darwin’s theory of evolution beyond the
scientific objections that were also raised when that theory had much less support.
For example, a theist might feel that a multiverse theory would undercut the fine-
tuning argument for the existence of God. I shall not deny that it would undercut
the argument at the level of the constants of physics (though I think there would
still be such a design argument from the general apparently elegant structure of the
full laws of nature once they are known). However, the loss of one argument does
not mean that its conclusion is necessarily false.
I personally think it might be a theological mistake to look for fine tuning as
a sign of the existence of God. I am reminded of the exchange between Jesus and
the religious authorities recorded in the Gospel of Matthew 12:38-41: “Then some
of the scribes and Pharisees answered, saying, ‘Teacher, we want to see a sign from
You.’ But He answered and said to them, ‘An evil and adulterous generation seeks
after a sign, and no sign will be given to it except the sign of the prophet Jonah.
For as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the great fish, so will
the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. The men of
Nineveh will rise up in the judgment with this generation and condemn it, because
they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and indeed a greater than Jonah is here.’”
In other words, I regard the death and resurrection of Jesus as the sign given to us
that He is indeed the Son of God and Savior He claimed to be, rather than needing
signs from fine tuning.
Another theistic objection might be that with a multiverse explanation of the
constants of physics, there is nothing left for God to design. But God could well
have designed the entire multiverse, choosing elegant laws of nature by which to
create the entire thing. In any case, whatever the design is, whether a logically rigid
requirement, a simple free choice God made, or a complex free choice God made,
theists would ascribe to God the task of creating the entire universe or multiverse
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according to this design.
A third more specifically Christian objection might be that if the multiverse
(or even just our single part of the universe) is large enough for other civilizations
to have sinned and needed Christ to come redeem them by something similar to
His death on the Cross here on earth for our sins, then His death may not sound so
unique as the Bible says in Romans 6:10: “For the death that He died, He died to sin
once for all; but the life that He lives, He lives to God.” But the Bible was written
for us humans here on earth, so it seems unreasonable to require it to describe what
God may or may not do with other creatures He may have created elsewhere. We
could just interpret the Bible to mean that Christ’s death here on earth is unique
for our human civilization.
9 Conclusions
In conclusion, multiverses are serious ideas of present science, though certainly
not yet proven. They can potentially explain fine-tuned constants of physics but are
not an automatic panacea for solving all problems; only certain multiverse theories,
of which we have none yet in complete form, would be successful in explaining our
observations. Though multiverses should not be accepted uncritically as scientific
explanations, I would argue that theists have no more reason to oppose them then
they had to oppose Darwinian evolution when it was first proposed.
God might indeed so love the multiverse.
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